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Community prevalence rates of alcohol use disorders (AUDs) provided by epidemiologi-
cal studies using DSM-based diagnostic criteria pose several challenges: the rates appear
implausibly high to many epidemiologists; they do not converge across similar studies;
and, due to low service utilization by those diagnosed as disordered, they yield estimates
of unmet need for services so high that credibility for planning purposes is jeopardized. For
example, two early community studies using DSM diagnostic criteria, the Epidemiologic
Catchment Area Study (ECA) and the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS), yielded lifetime
AUD prevalence rates of 14 and 24%, respectively, with NCS unmet need for services
19% of the entire population. Attempts to address these challenges by adding clinical sig-
nificance requirements to diagnostic criteria have proven unsuccessful. Hypothesizing that
these challenges are due to high rates of false-positive diagnoses of problem drinking as
AUDs, we test an alternative approach. We use the harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis of
the concept of mental disorder as a guide to construct more valid criteria within the frame-
work of the standard out-of-control model of AUD. The proposed HD criteria require harm
and dysfunction, where harm can be any negative social, personal, or physical outcome,
and dysfunction requires either withdrawal symptoms or inability to stop drinking. Using
HD criteria, ECA and NCS lifetime prevalences converge to much-reduced rates of 6 and
6.8%, respectively. Due to higher service utilization rates, NCS lifetime unmet need is
reduced to 3.4%. Service use and duration comparisons suggest that HD criteria possess
increased diagnostic validity. Moreover, HD criteria eliminate 90% of transient teenage
drinking from disorder status. The HD version of the out-of-control model thus potentially
resolves the three classic prevalence challenges while offering a more rigorous approach
to distinguishing AUDs from problematic drinking.
Keywords: alcohol use disorder, alcohol dependence, addiction, validity of diagnosis, harmful dysfunction,
diagnostic criteria, psychiatric epidemiology
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
In this paper, we provide a novel reanalysis of prevalence rates for
alcohol use disorder (AUD) in two major epidemiological surveys.
First, in a lengthier-than-usual conceptual introduction, we offer a
rationale for rethinking standard DSM-type AUD diagnostic cri-
teria. Then, in “Materials and Methods,” systematically applying
the harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis of mental disorder (1) to
AUD diagnosis for the first time, we use items available in the
two surveys to formulate more conceptually valid AUD diagnos-
tic criteria that better identify dysfunction and harm. We then
use the HD-derived criteria to recalculate AUD prevalence rates
in the surveys, comparing the results to the prevalences yielded by
the DSM-based criteria originally used in the studies, and also to
the prevalences yielded by the new DSM-5 criteria.
We evaluate the HD and DSM criteria sets using a variety of
validity tests. Some of the validity tests use standard validators,
such as episode duration and service use, whereas others are more
novel. For example, we examine the degree to which each criteria
set addresses the longstanding puzzle of divergent prevalence rates
of AUD across surveys, a problem tackled in classic papers by
Regier et al. (2) and Narrow et al. (3) but which they failed to
resolve. We also examine whether the HD analysis might explain
the puzzlingly high rate of spontaneous remission among adoles-
cents with apparent AUD, a finding often cited by those who argue
that addiction is not really a disorder at all but a normal choice
process (4, 5). Additionally, we use the HD analysis to provide
estimates of unmet need for treatment of AUD that are dramat-
ically different from standard estimates and address the paradox
of enormous rates of apparent AUD but without any felt need for
treatment.
THE PUZZLE OF HIGH AND VARYING PREVALENCE RATES OF ALCOHOL
USE DISORDERS IN COMMUNITY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES
Epidemiological studies of community prevalence of AUDs
attempt to answer the question: how many people suffer from
an AUD during their lifetime (lifetime prevalence) or during a
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given year (1-year prevalence)? The answer to the prevalence ques-
tion has major implications for theories of etiology, research, and
public policy.
The usefulness of such prevalence estimates depends on how
validly the diagnostic criteria identify AUD. However, AUD preva-
lence estimates yielded by major DSM-based epidemiological
surveys indicate rates of untreated disorder that many epidemi-
ologists find implausibly high and that reveal puzzling disparities
across studies with broadly similar methodologies. In particu-
lar, the first two large DSM-based community epidemiological
surveys, the epidemiologic catchment area study [ECA (6)] and
National Comorbidity Survey [NCS (7)] used similar methods
and collected data within a decade of each other in the early 1980s
and early 1990s, yet yielded lifetime prevalence of AUDs in the
American population of 14 and 24%, respectively.
The more recent National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol
and Related Conditions [NESARC (8, 9)], the largest (N = 43,098)
cross-sectional study to date, with data collected only a decade
after the NCS, reported a lifetime DSM-IV (10) AUD rate of 30%,
substantially higher than the previous studies. Edwards et al. (11)
recently assessed lifetime DSM-IV and DSM-5 AUD prevalence in
a different data set and found essentially the same prevalence rate
of 31% for DSM-IV and 32% for DSM-5 AUD.
Moreover, the lifetime DSM AUD prevalences derived from
such cross-sectional studies are likely substantial underestimates
due to respondents’ failure to recall symptoms. DSM AUD preva-
lence estimates increase dramatically in longitudinal studies in
which respondents are assessed periodically for recent disorder. In
the Dunedin longitudinal study of a representative New Zealand
community sample, the prevalence of alcohol dependence alone
(not including alcohol abuse) during one or more of four sam-
pled 1-year periods between the ages of 18 and 32 was 32% (12).
This estimate did not include those who had symptoms only dur-
ing the other 11 1-year periods between ages 18 and 32, those
who qualified for diagnosis only before age 18 or after age 32,
and those who had alcohol abuse without dependence. Based on
the abuse/dependence ratio in other studies, one can project that
the Dunedin lifetime DSM-IV AUD prevalence including both
dependence and abuse – or equivalently applying the new single
DSM-5 AUD category – would be well over 50% of the popu-
lation in just the four sampled 1-year periods. These rates are
difficult to square with current claims that AUD is a brain disease
(13–15).
An alternative view is that many of the diagnosed individu-
als in epidemiological studies do not in fact have a disorder of
alcohol use at all but rather are heavy or problem drinkers for a
period of time. Of NESARC AUDs, 72% reported just one lifetime
episode, with a mean duration for single-episode cases of 2.7 years
for abuse and 3.4 years for dependence. Other studies support
high and rapid remission rates for AUDs rather than the chronic
deteriorating course often predicted (16). Moreover, the rates at
which diagnosed individuals seek help are extremely low. Lifetime
NESARC dependence and abuse cases sought some form of ser-
vice only 24 and 7% of the time, respectively. The revelation that,
contrary to the “disease” model of alcoholism, large numbers of
heavy drinkers manage to stop drinking heavily without therapeu-
tic support (17) suggests a non-disorder interpretation, thus that
many DSM diagnoses of AUD may be invalid if the diagnoses are
intended to identify a psychiatric disorder of impaired deliberation
or motivation in choosing to drink.
VALIDITY CONCERNS ABOUT DSM DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA
The ECA, NCS, and NESARC used DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria, respectively. It is not difficult to see
why DSM AUD criteria might be invalid and give rise to inflated
AUD prevalence estimates. The DSM system through its various
editions has included a confusing mélange of symptoms, concep-
tualizations, and categories for AUD, and the criteria for AUD have
often consisted primarily of harmful or socially undesirable effects
of alcohol use that can equally be present in non-disordered heavy
use of alcohol. Moreover, some DSM indicators of dependence
have been equally indicative of strong desire or habit within a
drinking-accepting environmental context. The general problem
with DSM criteria has been the use of criteria that lack adequate
specificity for identifying cases in which it can be inferred that
there is an underlying dysfunction of alcohol desire, as opposed
to negative effects of alcohol or indicators of strong desire to
drink alcohol. A systematic critique of DSM criteria is beyond
the scope of this article, but detailed specifications of DSM-III
(18), DSM-III-R (19), and DSM-5 (20) AUD diagnostic criteria
and how they were translated into ECA and NCS diagnostic cri-
teria are provided in the Tables A1, A2, and A5 in Appendix,
respectively.
Whereas DSM-III through to DSM-IV distinguished alcohol
abuse and dependence, the abuse category was eliminated in
DSM-5. Yet the abuse criteria (except for legal difficulties) were
incorporated in DSM-5 into a generic AUD category along with
dependence criteria and a new “craving” criterion, with a diagnos-
tic threshold lowered to 2 symptoms out of 11 from the previous
three symptoms out of seven. Thus, an individual can now be
diagnosed with AUD on the basis of symptoms that are very weak
indicators of dysfunction, such as the former abuse symptoms of
arguing with family members over alcohol use and driving under
the influence of alcohol.
FAILURE OF THE REGIER ET AL. (1998) AND NARROW ET AL. (2002)
ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE AUD DIAGNOSTIC VALIDITY
Based on the premise that implausibly high community disor-
der rates were due to the use of overly broad DSM diagnos-
tic criteria, two now-classic epidemiological analyses by Regier
et al. (2) and Narrow et al. (3) attempted to resolve the issue
of high and divergent prevalence rates emerging from the ECA
and NCS epidemiological surveys. Their reanalyses addressed a
broad range of disorders, but we limit the present discussion
to AUDs.
Regier et al. (2) considered only alcohol dependence, not alco-
hol abuse. After limiting the two studies to a common age range of
18–54 years old, the ECA and NCS 1-year prevalences (generally
considered more valid than lifetime prevalences in cross-sectional
studies relying on memory) were a divergent 4.1 and 7.4%, respec-
tively, with lifetime prevalences similarly divergent at 8.6 and
14.9%, respectively. Regier et al. performed a series of corrections
to the two studies’ data sets to try to bring the divergent 1-year
rates more into harmony. These included limiting both samples to
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those with certain race or geographic demographic characteristics
that yielded adequate subsample sizes in both studies to mini-
mize variance, weighting frequencies in both studies to match age
and gender frequencies in the 1990 Census, and applying similar
DSM-III-based diagnostic criteria with as closely similar word-
ing as possible across studies. Despite these corrections, the ECA
and NCS alcohol dependence prevalence rates remained high and
divergent at 4.6 and 8.3%, respectively.
Regier et al. suggested that the problem could lie instead in
inflated diagnostic rates due to invalid DSM criteria yielding false-
positive diagnoses: “The obvious question is whether each of the
final groups contains subjects with valid clinical diagnoses or if
either or both have a high proportion of false-positive responses.
. . . Based on the high prevalence rates identified in both the ECA
and the NCS, it is reasonable to hypothesize that some syndromes
in the community . . . do not represent true psychopathologic
disorders” (pp. 112, 114). The implication was that changes in
diagnostic criteria to improve validity were required.
Extending Regier et al.’s work, Narrow et al. (3) examined all
AUD including dependence and abuse, but only 1-year disorder.
They attempted to increase diagnostic validity by imposing a clini-
cal significance criterion, requiring service use or interference with
life a lot, on all ECA and NCS diagnoses. Noting that NCS preva-
lence rates are generally higher than ECA rates, Narrow et al. also
used the questionable strategy of combining the primary ECA
data with a second wave of ECA data collection a year after the
first, in which newly emergent symptoms as well as newly recalled
symptoms from the past were reported. They then compared the
cumulative two-wave ECA data to the NCS one-wave data, thus
increasing the overall ECA AUD prevalence rate to be closer to the
higher NCS rate (9.1 versus 9.9%, respectively). However, when
they applied the clinical significance requirement to increase valid-
ity, the resulting 1-year AUD rates diverged significantly, with final
rates of 8.9 and 6.5%, respectively.
The Narrow et al. reanalyses thus failed to establish convergence
for AUD. They also suffered from several problems. First, there was
not a persuasive rationale for comparing two-wave ECA data to
one-wave NCS data, except the ad hoc desire to force rates to con-
verge. Second, the appropriateness of using service contact as a
clinical significance diagnostic criterion is questionable, because
it undermines the point of a community study (21). Third, clin-
ical significance criteria generally have been found to have little
power to distinguish disorder from non-disordered distress (22,
23). Finally, divergent lifetime estimates were not addressed.
The Narrow et al. results triggered a debate that continues to
this day over whether cases eliminated from epidemiological dis-
order diagnoses by clinical significance criteria are mild disorders
or not disorders at all (24–28). Kessler et al. (24) accused Nar-
row et al. (3) of “an attempt to declare that mild cases do not
exist” (p. 1118). Regier et al. (28) responded that the goal is to
increase homogeneity and therefore validity: “Our objective is to
define increasingly homogenous diagnostic groups with greater
predictive validity with respect to both prevention and treatment
response” (p. 1059). Given that disorders can be mild and that
non-disordered heavy drinking can be quite harmful, an approach
to increasing validity and homogeneity other than by a clinical
significance threshold appears desirable.
THE HARMFUL DYSFUNCTION ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL
DISORDER
The study reported here attempts to improve the conceptual
validity (i.e., the disorder/non-disorder differentiation) of AUD
criteria by directly altering the diagnostic criteria rather than by
adding clinical significance criteria. Our attempt is guided by the
HD analysis of the concept of mental disorder (1, 29–34). The
DSM-5 definition of mental disorder asserts that a psychologi-
cal disturbance and the consequent distress and role impairment
is a disorder only when it “reflects a dysfunction in the psycho-
logical, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental
functioning” [(20), p. 20]. The HD analysis elaborates the defi-
nition’s concept of dysfunction as failure of some psychological
mechanism to perform its naturally selected biological function.
Dysfunction in this sense is not equivalent to “dysfunction” in the
sense of failing to function effectively in various social roles such as
in occupational or marital roles (as in a “dysfunctional marriage”
or when one is “dysfunctional at work”). Such failures are a form
of harm, but they often exist in non-disordered conditions and are
not dysfunctions in the definition’s intended sense of the failure
of some underlying psychological mechanism. Given the frequent
harmfulness of alcohol, the dysfunction requirement is critical to
the distinction between disordered and non-disordered drinking.
The judgment that harm is being caused by a dysfunction is
often highly inferential and fallible given our limited knowledge,
yet nonetheless implicit in all disorder diagnoses. Often, infer-
ences to underlying dysfunction are based on the context of the
symptoms (35), yet contextual information is lacking in many
AUD criteria (e.g., did you drink more than intended because of
social pressure, because the drinking itself made you more relaxed
about your goals, because you wanted a more intense high, or
because you no longer felt in control of your choice?). The DSM-
5’s and HD analysis’s dysfunction requirement underscores that
social deviance and conflicts between the individual and society,
although often warranting intervention, are not mental disorders
unless they are due to underlying dysfunctions. This provides a
conceptual “firewall” between sheer social control – such as inter-
vention to stop people from driving while intoxicated or to prevent
alcohol-facilitated foolish sexual choices – and medically neces-
sitated psychiatric treatment for disorder, in an area in which
moral and psychiatric judgments may easily get confusingly mixed
together.
THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL DISORDER AND THE LOSS-OF-CONTROL
MODEL OF ALCOHOL USE DYSFUNCTION
Given the lack of gold standards for dysfunction or, for that matter,
significant harm, the application of the HD analysis to the domain
of alcohol disorders depends on many decisions and judgments
that are disputable. Thus, there is no one unique HD “solution”
to how to diagnose alcohol disorders. Moreover, standard epi-
demiological studies do not necessarily ask questions in the way
most favorable for an HD analysis, so any reanalysis has to be
approximate and make conceptual compromises.
In this initial attempt to construct HD-inspired diagnostic cri-
teria for AUD, we do not propose a new conception of the relevant
dysfunction. Rather, we provisionally accept the standard view
that the dysfunction in AUD involves a “dependence syndrome”
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in which there is impairment of deliberation or motivation that
entails a pathological degree of loss-of-control over alcohol drink-
ing (36–41). The loss-of-control account was the basis for both the
ICD-10 and DSM-III-R and DSM-IV approaches (42, 43).
We attempt to be more rigorous about which criteria indicate
harm, which indicate dysfunction, and which indicate neither.
Edwards and Gross were explicit in their “biaxial” model that
the dependence syndrome as dysfunction must be distinguished
from all the many serious harms, which themselves of course may
warrant medical attention, that alcohol use can cause: “A person
may, for example, develop cirrhosis, lose his job, crash his car, or
break up his marriage through his drinking without suffering from
the dependence syndrome . . .. [T]he diagnosis of dependence . . .
should be made in relation to the primary symptoms . . . and
not by reference to the secondary damage” [(37), pp. 1060–1]. We
believe that the most plausible interpretation of the biaxial concep-
tion was ignored when DSM separated dependence, a presumptive
dysfunction, from abuse, a presumptive harm; as DSM-5’s defin-
ition of mental disorder indicates, to be a disorder a condition
must possess both dysfunction and harm, so neither is a disorder
by itself. To this extent, the DSM-5’s change to one AUD disorder
combining dependence and abuse criteria makes sense. However,
the DSM-5’s threshold for diagnosis of any 2 out of 11 symptoms
undermines the validity of diagnosis by not requiring that both
dysfunction and harm are present. The power of the HD approach
to limit false-positives and improve validity lies in distinguishing
harm indicators from indicators of loss-of-control dysfunction.
An alternative option would be to abandon the loss-of-control
view and embrace some alternative framework for understand-
ing dysfunction in AUD. However, no competing conception of
the possible dysfunction underlying AUDs conceived as psychi-
atric disorders is as well-developed as the out-of-control account
at this time. Brain-disorder accounts of substance use disorders,
while varying in the specific brain mechanisms that are proposed
as dysfunctional, are largely aimed at providing a deeper expla-
nation of the loss-of-control phenomenon and so fall within the
same domain.
In the recent literature, there are many who reject the interpre-
tation of alcoholism as a disorder caused by a psychological dys-
function of deliberation or motivation. They propose instead that
behavior labeled addiction is the result of normal choice mecha-
nisms. The account of addiction as disorder has been particularly
challenged by empirical data on non-clinical community patterns
of substance use showing high rates of spontaneous quitting even
after prolonged heavy use among those qualifying for substance
use disorder diagnoses (44–48). Moreover, in some psychiatric
accounts, the “out-of-control” description of the hypothesized
deliberative or motivational dysfunction has been implausibly
exaggerated into a total lack of control rather than a degree of
impairment and even, in some early descriptions, into an almost
inevitable descent into madness and death, which does not at all
fit the data and has garnered further skepticism. There has conse-
quently been enormous interest in models of decision making that
might explain apparent addictions as resulting from normal choice
processes rather than dysfunction (5, 49–56). These authors point
out that patterns of drinking that have been called compulsive are
predicted by well-established choice models and that this approach
is supported by much available data. These alternative approaches
to alcoholism predict that many who meet the presumed criteria
for loss-of-control (usually interpreted as dependence, not abuse)
will be able to quit drinking without professional help, contrary to
some standard “pathology” views.
We explore a different approach here to understanding the
provocative finding that so many “out-of-control drinkers” don’t
seek help and manage to quit drinking. We suggest that the hypoth-
esized loss-of-control AUD dysfunction has not been translated
rigorously enough into diagnostic criteria, yielding high false-
positive vulnerability. Thus, the true AUDs that do exist have been
obscured in epidemiological data by a tidal wave of non-cases that,
although they have various alcohol problems and symptoms, are
misclassified as AUDs understood as alcohol addiction. Accord-
ing to this view, the “normal choice” accounts may well explain
many or even most cases classified as AUDs in the community epi-
demiological literature, but these cases have been miscategorized
as disorders due to invalid diagnostic criteria.
AIMS OF THE STUDY
The present study uses the HD analysis to reformulate AUD
diagnostic criteria in an attempt to more validly capture the “out-
of-control” model of AUD. In this initial test of the viability of
this approach, we restrict our analysis to the ECA and NCS stud-
ies. In evaluating the results, we adopt the same four criteria as
Narrow et al.: lower AUD prevalence; converging ECA and NCS
AUD prevalence estimates; greater validity of criteria as indicated
by AUD cases manifesting standard validators; and increased con-
cordance between diagnosis and treatment, thus more meaningful
estimates of unmet need for AUD services. We compare the HD
analysis to traditional DSM criteria and to DSM-5 criteria.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SAMPLE AND MEASURES
Two datasets were used in these analyses. The NCS (7) is a
community-based epidemiological survey administered in face-
to-face interviews between September 14, 1990 and February 6,
1992, to 8,098 persons aged 15–54-years who are representative of
the US population. The sample used here consists of all adults aged
18–54 (N = 7,599). The ECA (6) interviewed respondents aged
18–98 (N = 19,182) at five sampled sites (Baltimore, MD, USA;
Durham, NC, USA; Los Angeles, CA, USA; St. Louis, MO, USA; and
New Haven, CT, USA) face-to-face between 1980 and 1985. Our
analytic sample includes only adults aged 18–54 (N = 11,092).
Data were weighted to account for selection and non-response
effects, and to match age, sex, and race distributions in the US
Census, in order to provide nationally representative estimates.
HD ALCOHOL USE DISORDER DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA
For the purpose of our HD analysis of AUD, we assumed, con-
sistent with the majority of the field’s literature over the past
half-century, that the psychiatric disorder category of AUD refers
to a disorder in which something has gone wrong with the func-
tioning of the individual’s systems of deliberation, motivation, and
decision making, when it comes to partaking of alcohol (57). We
also accepted the standard view that this change in motivational
structure can come about either due to physiological changes (e.g.,
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withdrawal symptoms when one stops drinking, drinking to pre-
vent withdrawal symptoms, inability to function normally without
alcohol use) or psychological reasons (e.g., inability to stop or cut
down drinking despite wanting to do so, craving for alcohol). We
proceeded similarly to DSM-5, defining one disorder that includes
all conditions deemed AUDs, rather than two (dependence and
abuse) as in DSM-IV.
We created three versions of the diagnostic criteria for HD AUD.
All were shaped by the HD conceptualization, but each drew on
a different set of questions. The “HD/ECA” version is formulated
within the constraints imposed by the questions available in the
ECA, as shown in Table A3 in Appendix. The “HD/NCS” version
is formulated using the somewhat broader NCS question set, as
shown in Table A4 in Appendix. These HD formulations allowed
us to test within each study for differences between standard and
HD prevalence rates. The third“HD/NCS (ECA comparable)”ver-
sion, also shown in Table A4 in Appendix, was based on NCS
questions but limited so as to be optimally comparable to the
HD/ECA criteria. This formulation allowed us to test whether
increasing the comparability of HD criteria across studies yielded
more convergent ECA and NCS prevalence rates.
To create these HD criteria sets, we categorized a study’s symp-
tom questions into the two broad HD components of dysfunction
and harm based on consensus after extensive discussion. Symp-
toms that fit neither category of dysfunction or harm (e.g., toler-
ance, habitual use of alcohol) are not shown and were ignored in
our HD formulation. Because virtually all diagnostic criteria for
AUD can have false-positive instances in which there is no disorder
but only normal intense desire, judgments of how to categorize
symptoms inevitably involved subjective judgments about opti-
mally balancing the elimination of false-positive diagnoses against
the avoidance of false negative diagnoses, and the judgments of
others might diverge from ours.
We made the HD AUD as broad as possible by requir-
ing that any one or more dysfunction criteria and any one or
more harm criteria be met for diagnosis. The HD/ECA dys-
function questions included: withdrawal symptoms (shakes, fits,
DTs, hallucinations); need a drink before breakfast; could not
do your ordinary daily work well unless you had had some-
thing to drink; and wanted to stop drinking but couldn’t. The
HD/NCS dysfunction criteria included: withdrawal symptoms
when stopping drinking; use of alcohol to make withdrawal
symptoms go away; either persistently wanting to stop or cut
down or actually trying to cut down or stop drinking alcohol,
but being unable to do so; and feeling such a strong desire for
alcohol that one could not resist it. The set of symptoms indi-
cating harm were extensive in both studies (Tables A3 and A4 in
Appendix).
We formulated the best HD criteria for each study, allowing
criteria to differ across studies. The literature tends to emphasize
that relatively small differences in criteria can sometimes cause
rather large differences in prevalence rates. Consequently, previous
attempts to achieve convergent AUD rates attempted to homog-
enize diagnostic criteria across studies (2, 3). In contrast, our
HD-type criteria diverged considerably across studies in both con-
tent and wording of the specific dysfunction and harm items, as the
appendix tables indicate. We hypothesized that if there is a cogent
underlying AUD construct, and if diagnostic criteria selected from
each study validly reflect this construct, then varying syndromal
definitions should approximate to the same construct and yield
convergent results.
A potentially controversial decision was not to include as a
dysfunction indicator what is known as the “larger/longer” ques-
tion, which asks whether the respondent drinks larger amounts or
longer than intended. Larger/longer is sometimes labeled an “out-
of-control” question (11) but we did not think this question as
currently formulated indicates dysfunction with adequate speci-
ficity. The question overestimates the rationality of human agents
by assuming that prior judgments about what is best, which may
be shaped by social expectations, normally control later behavior.
Drinking more than intended is commonly due to social pressure
rather than compulsion; being the only one to stop drinking in a
group can be quite difficult. Moreover, the larger/longer question
refers to behavior that occurs during an episode of drinking, after
one starts to drink. Thus, the disinhibiting effects of alcohol itself
on one’s resolve rather than a motivational disorder about need-
ing to drink alcohol can be responsible for drinking more than
intended. More specificity in the question might make it usable as
a dysfunction indicator in the future.
Another controversial judgment was that continuing to use
alcohol despite knowledge of negative consequences – for example,
threats to health or family conflicts over use – does not consti-
tute adequate evidence to infer a dysfunction. Many people drink
against medical advice, and we concluded that this is a problem but
not prima facie specifically a dysfunction. The fact that rats may
continue to engage in alcohol use despite foot shocks has been
cited as a dependence indicator (58), but this observation begs the
question between strongly preferred use and loss-of-control. For
example, the classic demonstration of the normal curiosity motive
is that chimps will undergo electric shocks to look out of a window,
but no one concludes they have a curiosity addiction.
The HD analysis maintains that a dysfunction is only a disorder
if it causes harm. However, there can be disagreement about pre-
cisely what forms of harm should be allowable. For example, the
DSM relies heavily on social role impairment to fulfill the “harm”
criterion, whereas the ICD aspires to separate disorder diagno-
sis from evaluation of role impairment due to the heavy cultural
loading of role impairment. Some argue that when a dysfunction’s
harm is due solely to social disapproval or stigma, labeling the
condition as a disorder illegitimately pathologizes anomalous vari-
ation that would be benign in a context of social tolerance (59–62).
However, in this initial test of the HD approach, we included all
available harm items of whatever nature within our HD criteria for
each data set. Given that we were predicting a substantial reduction
in prevalence, we did not want to construct the “harm” criterion
in a way that could be seen as biasing the result toward our pre-
dicted lower prevalence. We thus construed“harm”in the broadest
possible terms, including such socially anchored harms as family
arguments, to allow for the most challenging test of our prediction.
DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR COMPARISON RATES OF ALCOHOL USE
DISORDER: ECA, NCS, DSM-5, AND NARROW ET AL.
We used the standard AUD variables from the NCS and ECA,
which include both dependence and abuse (Tables A3 and A4 in
www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 10 | 5
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wakefield and Schmitz Alcohol use disorders as harmful dysfunctions
Appendix), to calculate standard lifetime and 1-year prevalence
rates to compare to the HD rates.
Lifetime and 1-year disorder diagnoses in both the ECA and the
NCS were calculated using a“broad”approach that required fulfill-
ing diagnostic criteria with symptoms experienced at some point,
but not necessarily during the same period of time as required by
the DSM (1-year disorder required at least one symptom in the
last year). To evaluate the effects of moving from broad to narrow
1-year definitions where all symptoms must occur in the last year,
we also calculated the “narrow” version of NCS 1-year AUD.
We also created lifetime and 1-year NCS DSM-5 prevalence esti-
mates based on an approximation to the new DSM-5 diagnostic
criteria, requiring at least 2 out of 11 symptoms. (The ECA con-
tained insufficient comparable questions to make an ECA DSM-5
version practical.) The NCS questions used for the DSM-5 AUD
diagnostic criteria are indicated in Table A5 in Appendix. One-
year DSM-5 AUD was calculated using the narrow approach; at
least two symptoms qualifying the individual for diagnosis must
have occurred within the year prior to the interview. Finally, we
also cite for comparative purposes the prevalence rates derived
from Narrow et al.’s (3) reanalysis of the ECA and NCS, described
above.
Use of DSM combined dependence and abuse versus
dependence-only in AUD comparison rates
DSM-III inaugurated the distinction between dependence and
abuse, which lasted through to DSM-IV and has been elimi-
nated in DSM-5. We compare HD prevalence to standardly cited
AUD prevalence rates, which in the ECA and NCS as well as
most published studies of AUD, including all the major studies
evaluating DSM-5 AUD criteria, are based on combined depen-
dence and abuse. On its face, “abusing” alcohol does not appear
to imply disorder, so one might wonder why we include abuse
in the primary AUD analyses rather than just focusing on depen-
dence cases which seem more tailored to the out-of-control model.
There are three reasons. First, despite the seeming semantic incon-
sistency, DSM-III and subsequent DSM editions have classified
abuse as an AUD, and all major epidemiological surveys have
followed suit in reporting their results. To take one example, in
Sussman et al.’s (63) attempt to estimate overall addiction rates,
they note, “Both drug ‘abuse’ and ‘dependence’ were considered
as ‘addicted’ in the table and in our calculations” (p. 5). The clas-
sification of abuse as a true AUD generally has been justified by
claims that it is a mild form of dependence or that it is a pro-
dromal condition increasing risk for dependence. Second, the new
DSM-5 approach has eliminated the dependence/abuse distinc-
tion and reflects a “dimensional” view that there is no in-principle
separation of abuse from dependence, which are interpreted to
represent milder and more severe points on a continuum of dis-
order. To pursue legitimate comparisons to DSM-5, we needed
to include DSM abuse cases from earlier criteria sets. Third, we
needed to include DSM abuse within our primary comparisons
because those with DSM abuse can in principle satisfy HD (as
well as DSM-5) diagnostic criteria. This is because we define
HD AUD to include any individual with one form of dysfunc-
tion and one harm. Thus, an individual might meet DSM abuse
criteria based on one harm, and also have only one dependence
symptom (e.g., an individual might have withdrawal symptoms
and also drive under the influence but have no other symp-
toms), and thus not qualify for dependence diagnosis, and yet
meet HD AUD based on a harm and a dysfunction (and also meet
DSM-5 criteria based on 2 out of the 11 possible abuse and depen-
dence symptoms). Thus, restricting the comparison to dependence
would have foreclosed the empirical question of whether DSM
abuse cases qualify as HD cases (or, for that matter, as DSM-5
cases).
However, we were cognizant of the possible objection that it
is really the criteria for DSM dependence that represented the
true out-of-control construct, thus that the HD analysis appeared
to be an improvement only because it was compared to the
broader category of combined dependence/abuse rather than the
stricter category of dependence to which it is quite similar. To
address this concern, we repeated all of our primary analyses,
but this time comparing HD disorder to DSM dependence rather
than combined dependence/abuse. We assess whether this change
in comparison category changes our conclusions in important
ways.
VALIDATOR VARIABLES
Several variables were used as validators in the analyses, all based
on lifetime NCS reports. One validator was directly associated
with alcohol use: mean duration of the AUD, calculated from age
of onset and age of recency reports. Three validators assessed ser-
vice use associated with the use of alcohol or drugs: percentage
who ever saw a mental health professional about substance use;
percentage who ever attended AA or NA meetings because of their
substance use; percentage who ever went to a drug or alcohol
outpatient clinic for help with emotions, nerves, or use of alco-
hol or drugs. Non-substance use comorbidity was assessed by the
percentage of respondents having any lifetime mood or anxiety
disorder, assessed with the standard NCS/DSM-III-R criteria based
diagnostic variables.
Once we had the results of our primary analyses, we then per-
formed several post hoc analyses to illuminate the meaning of our
results. These included tests of HD specificity, HD sensitivity, HD
item frequencies, and a comparison of HD and standard remission
rates. These tests are described below in Results.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
All of the statistical analyses used Stata 12 survey estimation pro-
cedures (64), which calculate weighted coefficients (using the ECA
and NCS weights) to yield national estimates, and use Taylor
series linearization to calculate standard errors, adjusting for the
complex sampling designs of the two surveys. Because of the over-
lapping nature of the different groups, independent sample t -tests
were not performed, and significant differences are indicated by
non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals presented in the results
below.
RESULTS
Demographic characteristics of those with standard NCS AUD and
those with the HD version of NCS AUD are presented in Table 1,
for both lifetime and 1-year diagnoses. Differences are minimal,
with 1-year HD disordered individuals tending to be slightly older
and less educated than 1-year NCS AUD individuals.
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Table 1 | Means and percentages (95% confidence intervals) for demographic variables of lifetime and 1-year alcohol disorders, ages 18–54,
N =7,599.
Lifetimea 1-yearb
NCS (n=1,947) HD/NCS (n=550) NCS (n=793) HD/NCS (n=336)
Female (%) 31.5 (28.0, 34.9) 31.2 (25.3, 37.1) 27.8 (23.4, 32.3) 27.5 (19.3, 35.7)
Mean age 33.3 (32.6, 33.9) 34.6 (33.6, 35.6) 30.7 (29.7, 31.7) 34.1 (33.0, 35.3)
Mean years of education 12.8 (12.5, 13.0) 12.2 (11.9, 12.4) 12.4 (12.2, 12.7) 11.9 (11.6, 12.2)
White (%) 84.0 (79.6, 88.4) 80.9 (74.0, 87.7) 82.5 (76.5, 88.4) 79.8 (71.6, 88.0)
Weighted and corrected for sampling design.
NCS, National Comorbidity Survey; HD, harmful dysfunction. See “Appendix” for details of diagnostic criteria.
Significant differences between groups are indicated by non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals.
aFor each lifetime diagnostic criteria set, the symptoms could occur at any time point in the respondent’s lifetime; the symptoms did not need to occur together.
bFor the 1-year NCS criteria set, at least one symptom had to appear in the year prior to the interview; in the 1-year HD diagnostic criteria set, all symptoms had to
appear in the year prior to the interview.
Table 2 | Lifetimea prevalence (95% confidence intervals) for alcohol use disorder (AUD) in the ECA and NCS community studies, using standard
versus harmful dysfunction (HD) diagnostic criteria, and limited to common age range of 18–54.
Community study Diagnostic criteria used to calculate AUD prevalence rate
Standard ECA and
NCS criteria
DSM-5 Criteria HD/ECA and HD/NCS
criteria
HD/ECA and HD/NCS (adjusted
to be ECA comparable) criteria
ECA (N =11,092) 15.4 (14.6, 16.1) 6.0 (5.4, 6.6) 6.0 (5.4, 6.6)
NCS (N =7,599) 24.9 (23.1, 26.7) 19.5 (18.0, 21.0) 6.8 (5.9, 7.7) 5.5 (4.9, 6.1)
Weighted and corrected for sampling design.
ECA, epidemiologic catchment area study; NCS, National Comorbidity Survey; HD, harmful dysfunction. See “Appendix” for details of diagnostic criteria.
Significant differences between groups are indicated by non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals.
aFor each diagnostic criteria set, the symptoms could occur at any time point in the respondent’s lifetime; the symptoms did not need to occur together.
Lifetime ECA and NCS AUD prevalence estimates for ages 18–
54 using various diagnostic criteria sets are presented in Table 2.
Standard ECA and NCS criteria yield AUD prevalences of 15 and
25%, respectively. The DSM-5 criteria yield a lifetime prevalence
estimate of 19.5%, significantly higher than the ECA’s but signif-
icantly lower than the NCS’s. The HD criteria yield dramatically
lower lifetime prevalence estimates for both the ECA and the NCS
of 6 and 6.8%, respectively, both significantly and very substan-
tially lower than the ECA, NCS, or DSM-5 rates. This addresses
the first challenge of the seemingly implausibly high prevalence
rates.
For comparison purposes, we note that the reported ECA and
NCS lifetime dependence prevalence rates, excluding abuse-only
cases, as reported by Regier et al. (2), are 11.3 and 14.9% for
the ECA and NCS, respectively. These dependence rates are still
substantially above HD AUD rates.
To test whether ECA and NCS prevalences converge if simi-
lar criteria are used, we recalculated the HD/NCS criteria using
the ECA comparable version. This yielded 6% for the ECA and
5.5% for the NCS, which were not significantly different. Indeed,
even before this correction the ECA and NCS HD rates of 6% and
6.8%, respectively, were not different. This addressed the second
challenge, of showing that with more valid diagnostic criteria, the
rates across studies might converge.
Similar results were found for 1-year prevalence estimates
(Table 3). The 1-year AUD estimates using the ECA and NCS
standard criteria were 7.3 and 9.9%, respectively. These rates were
significantly different from each other, and significantly higher
than the corresponding HD analysis’s estimates for the ECA and
NCS of 3.3 and 4.3%, respectfully, which were not significantly dif-
ferent. Recalculating the NCS prevalence using a narrow approach
that required clustering of criteria lowered the rate considerably
(7.0%) but still left it significantly above the HD rate, demon-
strating that the reduction resulting from the HD analysis was not
due to the change to narrow criteria alone but to the differences
in symptom criteria for disorder. The DSM-5 prevalence estimate
(9.8%) is virtually identical with the standard NCS result.
Narrow et al. (3), in their unsuccessful attempt to reconcile
the significant differences in the ECA and NCS 1-year preva-
lence estimates, arrived at ECA and NCS AUD rates of 8.9 and
6.5%, respectively. These adjusted rates are quite different from
each other and in both cases significantly higher than the corre-
sponding HD estimates. For comparative purposes (not reported
in the table), the NESARC 1-year AUD rate was 8.5% (9), and the
Dunedin study average 1-year rate for alcohol dependence alone
for ages 18–32 was 12.7% (12).
As in the lifetime analysis, we recalculated the HD/NCS preva-
lence using HD/ECA comparable criteria to test for consistency
www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 10 | 7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wakefield and Schmitz Alcohol use disorders as harmful dysfunctions
Table 3 | One-year aprevalence (95% confidence intervals) for alcohol use disorder (AUD) in the ECA and NCS community studies, using
standard versus harmful dysfunction (HD) diagnostic criteria, and limited to common age range of 18–54.
Community study Diagnostic criteria used to calculate AUD prevalence rate
Standard
ECA and NCS
criteria
NCS:
narrow
criteria
DSM-5
criteria
Narrow et al. (3),
including clinical
significance criteria
HD/ECA and
HD/NCS
criteria
HD/ECA and HD/NCS
(adjusted to be ECA
comparable) criteria
ECA (N =11,092) 7.3 (6.7, 8.0) 8.9 (8.3, 9.5) 3.3 (2.8, 3.8) 3.3 (2.8, 3.8)
NCS (N =7,599) 9.9 (8.9, 11.0) 7.0 (6.1, 7.9) 9.8 (8.9, 10.7) 6.5 (5.7, 7.3) 4.3 (3.7, 5.0) 3.6 (3.0, 4.2)
Weighted and corrected for sampling design.
ECA, epidemiologic catchment area study; NCS, National Comorbidity Survey; HD, harmful dysfunction. See “Appendix” for details of diagnostic criteria.
Significant differences between groups are indicated by non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals.
aFor the Standard ECA and NCS criteria sets, at least one symptom had to appear in the year prior to the interview; in the NCS, narrow criteria, DSM-5, Narrow et al.
and HD diagnostic criteria sets, all symptoms had to appear in the year prior to the interview.
Table 4 | Means and percentages (95% confidence intervals) for validators of NCS lifetime aalcohol use disorders, ages 18–54, N =7,599.
NCS (n=1,947) HD/NCS (n=550) DSM-5 (n=1,536)
Mean duration, years 8.3 (7.6, 9.0) 12.1 (11.1, 13.1) 9.1 (8.3, 9.9)
% See mental health professional about substance use, everb 11.8 (10.4, 13.3) 27.1 (22.1, 32.2) 14.9 (12.9, 16.8)
% Attended AA or NA meetings, everc 18.4 (15.7, 21.1) 44.6 (38.3, 50.9) 22.6 (19.1, 26.0)
% Went to drug or alcohol outpatient clinic, everd 6.0 (4.6, 7.3) 15.8 (11.7, 20.0) 7.2 (5.5, 8.8)
% Have any NCS mood or anxiety disorder, lifetimee 47.7 (44.0, 51.4) 62.4 (57.4, 67.4) 50.7 (47.0, 54.4)
% Of transient teen users with NCS AUD having the given disorder, ages 15–54f 100 (n=287) 10.3 (5.5, 12.6) (n=29) 65.2 (57.7, 72.6) (n=184)
Weighted and corrected for sampling design.
NCS, National Comorbidity Survey; HD, harmful dysfunction.
Significant differences between groups are indicated by non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals.
aFor each diagnostic criteria set, the symptoms could occur at any point in the respondent’s lifetime. They did not need to occur at the same time point.
bDid you ever see a mental health specialist about your substance use? (By mental health specialists we mean psychiatrists, psychologists, or social workers.)
cDid you ever go to a self-help group like Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous because of your substance use?
dHave you ever gone to a drug or alcohol outpatient clinic for professional help with your emotions or nerves or your use of alcohol or drugs?
e% Any mood or anxiety disorder, lifetime, for the entire sample: 34.7 (32.6, 36.7).
fTeen transient users defined as having lifetime NCS alcohol disorder, but not having 1-year NCS alcohol disorder, age of onset at 19 years old or younger, alcohol
disorder duration <5 years; uses full sample, N= 8098, for analyses. By the definition, all of the teen transient users have lifetime NCS alcohol disorder, giving the
100% result for that cell in the above table. The other cells in that row are based on those 287 cases as the base rate in the denominators.
across studies, and found the ECA and NCS rates converging to 3.3
and 3.6%, respectively. These tests address the first two challenges
for the 1-year rates; they show dramatically reduced rates rela-
tive to other studies, and rates that converge across the two target
studies when comparable HD-based criteria are used.
Here, too, for comparative purposes, we note the standard 1-
year dependence prevalence rates of 5.0 and 8.3% for the ECA
and NCS, respectively, taken from Regier et al. (2). Like the life-
time dependence rates, these 1-year dependence rates are still
substantially above those yielded by the HD analysis.
An additional finding is that DSM-5 criteria, at least in our
approximation, does not substantially improve on previous cri-
teria with regard to implausibly high rates (Tables 2 and 3). The
lifetime rate of 19.5% is a bit lower than the NCS lifetime rate but
higher than the ECA rate, and the 1-year DSM-5 rate of 9.8% is
the same as the NCS rate and significantly higher than the ECA
rate. This is to be expected; the changes to the criteria in DSM-5
were designed to leave overall AUD prevalence about the same as
before. For comparison purposes, Edwards et al. (11) found a life-
time DSM-5 AUD prevalence rate of 32%, and Agrawal et al. (65)
and Mewton et al. (66) found 1-year DSM-5 prevalence rates of
10.8 and 9.7%, respectively.
Reducing prevalence rates can be easily accomplished in a num-
ber of ways, but the achievement is meaningless if the resulting
classification is not valid (21). The results of validator tests for life-
time disorder are presented in Table 4, and consistently support
the validity of the HD criteria. The HD cases possess significantly
greater duration – by about 3–4 years on average – than NCS
and DSM-5 cases. For each of three service use indicators – saw
a mental health professional, attended AA, and went to an alco-
hol outpatient clinic – the rates for the HD group are double or
more the rates of the other two groups, and significantly higher
in every case. Regarding comorbid mood and anxiety disorders,
these disorders as defined by the DSM are quite common so all the
rates are high, but the rate of comorbidity for the HD group is still
significantly higher than for either of the other two groups.
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Table 5 | Means and percentages (95% confidence intervals) for validators of NCS 1-year aalcohol use disorders, ages 18–54, N =7,599.
NCS: broad
criteria (n=793)
NCS: narrow
criteria (n=539)
HD/NCS
(n=336)
DSM-5
(n=762)
Mean duration, years 10.4 (9.3, 11.4) 10.5 (9.3, 11.7) 13.0 (11.9, 14.1) 10.7 (9.6, 11.8)
% See mental health professional about substance use, everb 11.9 (9.1, 14.8) 11.6 (8.7, 14.4) 31.5 (24.6, 38.4) 19.1 (15.3, 22.8)
% Attended AA or NA meetings, everc 20.5 (16.1, 24.9) 23.3 (18.0, 28.6) 52.2 (44.7, 59.7) 29.4 (24.3, 34.5)
% Went to drug or alcohol outpatient clinic, everd 7.8 (5.3, 10.4) 8.5 (5.1, 12.0) 20.4 (14.3, 26.5) 11.5 (8.4, 14.6)
% Have any NCS mood or anxiety disorder, lifetimee 50.1 (44.4, 55.8) 49.9 (43.2, 56.6) 62.8 (56.0, 69.7) 52.4 (47.1, 57.6)
Weighted and corrected for sampling design.
NCS, National Comorbidity Survey; HD, harmful dysfunction.
Significant differences between groups are indicated by non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals.
aFor the NCS: broad criteria set, at least one symptom had to appear in the year prior to the interview; in the NCS: narrow, HD and DSM-5 diagnostic criteria sets, all
symptoms had to appear in the year prior to the interview.
bDid you ever see a mental health specialist about your substance use? (By mental health specialists we mean psychiatrists, psychologists, or social workers.)
cDid you ever go to a self-help group like Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous because of your substance use?
dHave you ever gone to a drug or alcohol outpatient clinic for professional help with your emotions or nerves or your use of alcohol or drugs?
e% Any mood or anxiety disorder, lifetime for the entire sample: 34.7 (32.6, 36.7).
Table 6 | Unmet need: percentages (95% confidence intervals) of the general population having lifetime and 1-year alcohol use disorders but no
use of services, using NCS, HD, and DSM-5 diagnostic criteria, ages 18–54, N =7,599.
NCS NCS: narrow criteria HD/NCS DSM-5
Percentage of the general population with
lifetime alcohol use disorder but no service usea
19.2 (17.5, 20.9)
(n=1,475)
3.4 (2.7, 4.1)
(n=272)
14.0 (12.6, 15.5)
(n=1,088)
Percentage of the general population with
1-year alcohol use disorder but no service useb
7.4 (6.5, 8.4)
(n=577)
5.1 (4.4, 5.8) (n=381) 1.8 (1.3, 2.2)
(n=144)
6.3 (5.5, 7.1)
(n=476)
Weighted and corrected for sampling design. The number of cases of unmet need for each cell is given in square brackets.
NCS, National Comorbidity Survey; HD, harmful dysfunction.
“No service use”: respondent reported never having used any of the following three services: (1) seen a mental health professional about substance use, (2) gone to
a self-help group like Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous because of substance use, (3) gone to a drug or alcohol outpatient clinic for help with emotions,
nerves, or use of alcohol or drugs.
aFor each diagnostic criteria set, the symptoms could occur at any point in the respondent’s lifetime. They did not need to occur at the same time point. The baseline
lifetime disorder prevalence estimates are NCS: 24.9; HD: 6.8; DSM-5: 19.5.
bFor the NCS criteria set, at least one symptom had to appear in the year prior to the interview; in the NCS: narrow, HD/NCS, and DSM-5 diagnostic criteria sets, all
symptoms had to appear in the year prior to the interview. The baseline 1-year disorder prevalence rates are NCS: 9.9; NCS: narrow: 7.0; HD: 4.3; DSM-5: 9.8.
For the 1-year disorders, the validators tell a similar story
(Table 5). Duration is on average about two and a half years longer
for HD AUDs than for the others. Service use for all three ser-
vice use validators is significantly greater for HD criteria than for
NCS criteria, and as compared to the DSM-5 group is significantly
greater for two of the service use validators (saw a mental health
professional, attended AA) and marginally greater for the third
(attended an outpatient alcohol clinic). The validator rates for the
NCS 1-year narrow approach are no different from the rates for
the standard approach and do not changes the pattern of results
of the comparisons to the HD model, so the broad versus narrow
approach is not determining the results. Comorbidity is signifi-
cantly higher among HD-diagnosed than among NCS-diagnosed
individuals, and higher but not quite significantly so in relation to
DSM-5-diagnosed individuals.
Finally, the fourth challenge concerns the level of unmet need.
We defined unmet need for services as anyone who satisfies
diagnostic criteria for an AUD but answers “no” to all three ques-
tions regarding service use (saw a mental health professional,
attended AA, went to an outpatient clinic). Obviously, there are
many reasons for need for help with alcohol problems, some of
which may qualify as medically necessary when the alcohol is
threatening to exacerbate health problems. However, here we focus
on unmet need based specifically on AUD diagnosis. The result for
the NCS confirms the problem of unmanageable unmet need esti-
mates, with 19.2% of the entire population having an unmet need
for AUD services based on lifetime disorder, and 7.4% in a 1-
year period (Table 6). The DSM-5 criteria reduce these estimates
somewhat but still leave them enormously high, with 14.0% life-
time and 6.3% 1-year unmet need. Even the NCS 1-year narrowly
defined group yields a rate of 5% of the entire population having
unmet need in a given year. The HD criteria alter this unmanage-
ably challenging landscape by reducing lifetime and 1-year AUD
unmet need rates to 3.4 and 1.8%, respectively.
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SPECIFICITY ANALYSIS
As noted earlier, in post hoc analyses we performed rough tests
to examine diagnostic specificity and sensitivity. For testing
specificity, the challenge was to identify a criterion group of
respondents who exhibit drinking behaviors that might qualify
for AUD diagnosis, but who likely are not genuinely disordered.
The group we identified consists of respondents who participated
in sufficiently heavy drinking during their teenage years to be clas-
sified by NCS criteria as having an AUD, but who were transient
in their heavy usage and had remitted during young adulthood
and no longer qualified for AUD. There has been much discus-
sion recently of the possibility that such transient “teen bingers”
are being misclassified as having AUD (67–70). We assumed that
many members of this group are drinking as part of youthful social
relationships and – if they quickly and enduringly gave up such
behaviors as they matured – are most likely not suffering from
a physical or psychological dysfunction. We operationalized this
criterion group as any respondent who met lifetime NCS alcohol
disorder criteria, had an age of onset of 19 years old or younger, had
alcohol disorder duration <5 years, and remitted and did not have
1-year NCS alcohol disorder at the time of the NCS interview. We
predicted that more valid HD diagnostic criteria should eliminate
disproportionately many of this group from their classification as
disordered by the NCS.
The result of the specificity test for HD AUD validity, using
transient teen users classified by the NCS as disordered as the
criterion group, is presented in Table 4. By definition, 100% of
these individuals qualify for NCS lifetime disorder, yet given their
overall history, it is plausible that most were not disordered. We
found that DSM-5 criteria still classify 65% of these transient
teen users as disordered. In contrast, the HD analysis essentially
depathologizes this group, classifying only 10% of them as dis-
ordered. Notably, this is a disproportionate reduction; overall,
the HD criteria classify about 25% of the NCS disorders as HD
disorders.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Regarding sensitivity, a challenge facing the HD analysis is the fear
of false negative diagnoses due to reduction in cases. To exam-
ine this issue, we used service use indicators to test for sensitivity
of 1-year diagnosis. The idea was to see whether the HD analysis
missed a large number of individuals who sought services. The
test is approximate because the service use questions are lifetime
rather than 1-year and they do not specify whether the individual
sought help for alcohol or other substances. Moreover, many indi-
viduals seeking help with alcohol issues, or referred for such help,
may not be disordered. However, if the rate of individuals seeking
help but not HD disordered was extremely high, this might be a
red flag that there are problematic levels of false negatives.
We calculated the absolute number of individuals (unweighted)
with 1-year AUD who sought three kinds of measured service
use, comparing rates among those diagnosed with standard NCS
AUD versus HD/NCS AUD. For standard NCS 1-year disorder,
the numbers who sought services from the three service venues of
mental health professionals, AA or NA, and outpatient alcohol or
drug clinics were 94, 163, and 62, respectively; and for HD/NCS
the numbers were 106, 175, and 69, respectively. In other words,
despite the fact that HD/NCS classified only 42% as many individ-
uals as disordered as did the standard NCS criteria, HD/NCS AUD
still included a larger number of individuals who sought services
in each of the three service categories. By this test, it appears that
despite the HD approach’s lowering of prevalence, false negatives
may be minimal.
ITEM-LEVEL ANALYSES
Our primary analysis was undertaken at the full syndromal level.
Further studies will be necessary to explore the impact of each indi-
vidual symptom criterion on HD diagnosis and validity. However,
in post hoc analyses we calculated item-level prevalences in the
NCS HD sample to check whether any particular criteria had a
major role in the results.
For the four dysfunction indicators, the percentages of HD
disorders having that dysfunction ranged from 38 to 58%, and
the average number of dysfunctions was 1.9. Thus, in general if
a dysfunction was present then more than one dysfunction was
present. Regarding the nine harm items, in terms of percentages
of HD cases manifesting each harm, the average was 40%, but
there was a lower outlier (alcohol use often kept you from work-
ing, going to school, taking care of children, 4%) and two higher
outliers (problems with your family, friends, at work, at school
or with the police, 70%; under the effects of alcohol in situations
that increased your chances of getting hurt, like driving a car,
77%). The average number of harms for HD cases was 3.6, so the
two upper-end outliers were not responsible for our results; with-
out them, there was still an average of more than two harms per
HD case. Given the redundancy of both dysfunction and harm
in many cases, membership in the HD AUD category appears
to be a relativity robust feature not dependent on a particular
item.
REMISSION RATES OF STANDARD VERSUS HD AUD
An issue that has become salient in recent discussions of AUD is
whether individuals spontaneously remit from what is supposed
to be a disorder lacking control. Although in fact lack of con-
trol during an episode of disorder is in principle conceptually
distinct from whether one can or does remit from the disorder,
critics of the out-of-control model have tended to link the two,
suggesting that remission conflicts with the notion of being out-
of-control and that the observed pattern of remission conflicts
with the out-of-control model (54). Consequently, high rates of
AUD remission reported in epidemiological surveys have fueled
arguments that perhaps the entire conceptualization of AUD as a
disorder is mistaken.
To examine the remission issue, we performed a post hoc analy-
sis in which we compared NCS remission rates using standard
criteria to NCS remission rates using the HD criteria. As the indi-
cator of remission, we used the percentage of lifetime cases that
were not 1-year cases. For the NCS study, the standard 1-year and
lifetime rates were 9.9 and 24.9%, respectively, yielding a remission
rate of 60%. For the HD analysis, the 1-year and lifetime NCS dis-
order rates were 4.3 and 6.8%, respectively, yielding a substantially
lower remission rate of 37%. This result suggests the possibility
that as criteria are made more valid for picking out AUD in the
sense of disorder, remission rates may tend to drop substantially.
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HD ANALYSIS VERSUS DSM DEPENDENCE
As noted in“Materials and Methods,”one might object to the above
analyses that HD AUD is basically like traditional dependence, and
the improvements in convergence and validity that we found for
the HD criteria are explained by the fact that we compared the
HD criteria to the larger and less valid category of DSM combined
dependence/abuse. We thus repeated our analyses of convergence
of prevalence rates, validator rates, specificity and sensitivity tests,
and unmet need rates, but this time comparing HD criteria to
criteria for DSM dependence as defined in the ECA and NCS
(Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix). These analyses do not include
a comparison to DSM-5 criteria, because DSM-5 eliminated the
dependence/abuse distinction.
First, was our striking finding of convergent prevalence rates
across studies virtually guaranteed by the HD analysis’s similarity
to DSM dependence? The answer is that no such piggybacking on
dependence can explain our convergence results. The results indi-
cate, first, that DSM dependence is itself highly divergent across
the ECA and NCS studies. Lifetime prevalence of DSM depen-
dence in the ECA is 8.8% (8.1, 9.5), but in the NCS it is 14.9%
(13.6, 16.3). Similarly, 1-year prevalence of DSM dependence in
the ECA is 4.2% (3.8, 4.7), whereas in the NCS it is 7.4% (6.5,
8.4); with Regier et al.’s corrections to increase comparability, the
1-year prevalences are 4.6 and 8.3%, respectively. In both cases,
the ECA/NCS differences are not only significant but substantial,
in contrast to the convergence of HD prevalences.
When it comes to convergence of prevalence rates across stud-
ies, DSM dependence actually performs worse than combined
dependence/abuse. Using the percentage change in prevalence
from the ECA to the NCS as a measure of divergence (the larger
the percentage change, the greater the divergence), the ECA-to-
NCS percentage changes in both lifetime and 1-year prevalence
is greater for dependence (lifetime, 69% change; 1-year, 76%
change both without and with corrections) than for combined
dependence/abuse (lifetime, 62% change; 1-year, 37% change).
Therefore, no purported resemblance to dependence can explain
the lower changes in HD prevalence rates (without corrections,
lifetime, 13% change; 1-year, 30% change; with corrections to
increase comparability, lifetime, 8% change; 1-year, 9% change).
We also duplicated our earlier validity analysis using the same
five primary validators, but applied to NCS dependence rather
than combined dependence/abuse. For four validators (duration,
ever saw a mental health professional for substance use, ever
attended AA or NA meetings, ever went to an outpatient drug
or alcohol clinic), the percentage with HD disorder who had that
validator was significantly and substantially higher than the per-
centage of those with NCS dependence disorder who had the
validator (Table 7). Generally speaking, the average duration of
HD disorder was about two and a half years longer than for DSM
dependence (e.g., average lifetime duration was 9.7 years for DSM
dependence, and 12.1 years for HD disorder), and the rates of ser-
vice use for HD disorder were consistently about twice as high
as for DSM dependence (e.g., percentages of 1-year DSM depen-
dence cases using mental health professional and AA/NA services
were 14.7 and 25.7%, respectively, whereas corresponding per-
centages for 1-year HD were 31.5 and 52.2%, respectively). For the
one remaining validator (comorbid mood or anxiety disorder),
HD disorder was higher on the validator but not significantly so
(Table 7). These results support the greater validity of HD disorder
over NCS dependence.
Table 7 | Means and percentages (95% confidence intervals) for validators of NCS lifetime and 1-year aalcohol dependence disorders versus HD
AUD, ages 18–54, N =7,599.
NCS dependence:
lifetime (n=1,182)
NCS dependence:
1-year (n=597)
HD lifetime
(n=550)
HD 1-year
(n=336)
Mean duration, years 9.7 (9.0, 10.5) 10.5 (9.3, 11.7) 12.1 (11.1, 13.1) 13.0 (11.9, 14.1)
% See mental health professional about substance use, everb 16.9 (14.5, 19.4) 14.7 (11.2, 18.1) 27.1 (22.1, 32.2) 31.5 (24.6, 38.4)
% Attended AA or NA meetings, everc 27.6 (23.6, 31.6) 25.7 (19.8, 31.7) 44.6 (38.3, 50.9) 52.2 (44.7, 59.7)
% Went to drug or alcohol outpatient clinic, everd 8.8 (6.8, 10.8) 9.7 (6.6, 12.8) 15.8 (11.7, 20.0) 20.4 (14.3, 26.5)
% Have any NCS mood or anxiety disorder, lifetimee 53.1 (48.8, 57.4) 53.9 (48.0, 59.8) 62.4 (57.4, 67.4) 62.8 (56.0, 69.7)
% Of transient teen users with NCS AUD having the given
disorder, ages 15–54
100 (n=88) 17.8 (7.7, 27.9)
(n=19)
% Of general population with given alcohol disorder but no
service use
10.0 (8.9, 11.2)
(n=777)
5.1 (4.3, 5.9)
(n=399)
3.4 (2.7, 4.1)
(n=272)
1.8 (1.3, 2.2)
(n=144)
Weighted and corrected for sampling design.
aFor the NCS at least one symptom had to appear in the year prior to the interview.
bDid you ever see a mental health specialist about your substance use? (By mental health specialists we mean psychiatrists, psychologists, or social workers.)
cDid you ever go to a self-help group like Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous because of your substance use?
dHave you ever gone to a drug or alcohol outpatient clinic for professional help with your emotions or nerves or your use of alcohol or drugs?
e% Any mood or anxiety disorder, lifetime for the entire sample: 34.7 (32.6, 36.7).
NCS alcohol dependence lifetime prevalence: 14.9% (13.6, 16.3).
HD alcohol disorder lifetime prevalence: 6.8% (5.9, 7.7).
NCS alcohol dependence 1-year prevalence: 7.4% (6.5, 8.4).
HD alcohol disorder 1-year prevalence: 4.3% (3.7, 5.0).
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Is NCS dependence more valid on our indicators than NCS
combined dependence/abuse? Comparing Table 7 to Tables 4
and 5, the increment in validity in moving from combined
dependence/abuse to dependence, as indicated by increasing per-
centages of validators, is surprisingly modest. For 1-year disorder,
there is a trend for dependence to be slightly higher on validator
percentages, but the increases do not reach significance on any
of the validators. Of particular interest is that the reported dura-
tion of dependence cases and combined dependence/abuse cases
is virtually identical. Looking at lifetime validators, dependence
is significantly higher than combined dependence/abuse on two
out of the five validators (seeing a professional, attending AA or
NA), and for the other three validators there is not a significant
difference. A limitation is that these NCS analyses used DSM-III-R
criteria, but these are quite similar in major respects to DSM-IV
criteria (three out of nine symptoms, many having similar word-
ing to that used in DSM-IV). Clearly, the validity results for the
HD criteria cannot be explained by any parasitic relationship to
dependence, which does only very modestly better than combined
dependence/abuse.
In terms of unmet need (Table 7), dependence rates are lower
than combined dependence/abuse, but still very high. The HD
analysis reduces both lifetime and 1-year NCS dependence rates
of unmet need by about two-thirds. For example, in a given year,
instead of 5.1% of the entire adult population having unmet
need for treatment according to the dependence criteria, only
1.8% of the population has unmet need for treatment by the HD
analysis.
For the HD versus dependence comparison, we duplicated the
specificity and sensitivity analyses we did for combined depen-
dence/abuse. For specificity, of the individuals who reported tran-
sient adolescent drinking and who qualified for NCS dependence,
only about 18% of them also qualified for HD disorder, so the
HD criteria are still making a major difference (Table 7). This is
a highly disproportionate reduction; overall, about 47% of those
who qualified for NCS dependence also qualified for HD disorder.
Thus, if one suspects that transient adolescent use of alcohol is
being overdiagnosed, then the HD analysis appears to offer a more
effective corrective than dependence.
The sensitivity analysis again used 1-year data, and we used the
two most frequent service use indicators – ever seeing a profes-
sional about substance use and ever attending AA or NA meetings
(again, these items were limited by not being specific to alco-
hol). For both validators, despite the fact that 1-year HD disorders
occurred only 56% as frequently as NCS dependence, the absolute
number of diagnosed individuals who reported service use was
higher for HD disorder than for NCS dependence. For 1-year NCS
dependence, 88 individuals reported seeing a mental health pro-
fessional and 153 reported attending AA or NA; the comparable
figures for 1-year HD disorder were 106 seeking professional help
and 175 attending AA or NA. The HD criteria thus managed to
pick out the service use seekers from among a much larger pool
of NCS-dependent individuals, and even identified a considerable
number of help-seeking individuals the NCS dependence criteria
had missed.
The remission rate of NCS DSM dependence – that is, the
percentage of those with lifetime dependence who did not have
1-year dependence – was 50%. This was lower than the remission
rate for combined dependence/abuse (60%) but higher than the
HD remission rate (37%).
These analyses disconfirm the idea that the success of the HD
analysis in yielding prevalence convergence across studies and
increasing validator levels is due to its being similar to depen-
dence and our having used the broader dependence/abuse cat-
egory for comparisons. Indeed, within the constraints of these
analyses, these results cast doubt on the common belief that
DSM dependence is a much more valid category than combined
dependence/abuse. In any event, the incremental value of the HD
approach over dependence is strongly affirmed.
DISCUSSION
The distinction between problem drinking and AUD is important
both conceptually and pragmatically. Mixing together those who
choose to drink heavily or suffer adverse effects of doing so with
those who have a mental disorder of drinking motivation – thus
yielding “false-positive” AUD diagnoses – undermines attempts to
establish brain correlates of disorder, identify etiological pathways
and risk factors for disorder, offer patients appropriate prognosis
and informed consent for treatment, and test treatments aimed at
ameliorating disorder (71). The standard view of the dysfunction
that exists in AUD since about the mid-twentieth century, and
the view underlying the DSM’s approach to diagnosis of AUDs
as well as the present analysis, is that some people who drink to
excess suffer from a motivational dysfunction that leads to loss of
normal-range deliberative control over drinking (57). The attempt
to improve validity of AUD diagnosis in the present study took
place within the framework of the loss-of-control model.
Alcohol use is an area of social ambivalence that warrants cau-
tion among nosologists lest they become agents of social control
by labeling harmful or disapproved behavior as disordered when
there is no evidence of dysfunction. Yet DSM AUD diagnostic cri-
teria seem to inhabit an alternative conceptual universe in which
problems common among the non-addicted, such as arguing with
family members over alcohol use, strong preference for alcohol-
related activities, and driving under the influence of alcohol are
taken as prima facie evidence of a psychiatric disorder rather than
simply harmful effects of drinking. Without valid criteria distin-
guishing AUD from non-disordered problems, in the long run it
will be more difficult for research to unlock AUD etiology and
to identify effective treatments, and in the short run treatment
selection will be muddied by diagnostic mixing of very different
conditions.
The present study attempted to approach the criteria with a
strict focus on conceptual validity, especially in requiring indica-
tors of dysfunction. Our central hypothesis was that the out-of-
control model had not been given a fair test because of confusion
in diagnostic criteria between motivational dysfunctions on the
one hand and harmful effects of drinking and strong preferences
for drinking on the other hand. We provided initial data on the
validity of a possible HD translation of the loss-of-control model.
MAJOR NOVEL FINDINGS
Other researchers have noted the potential usefulness of conceptu-
alizing AUDs in terms of the HD analysis (72, 73), and some efforts
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to revise criteria have been along lines consistent with implicit HD
thinking (74–76). However, this is the first study explicitly and
systematically to formulate criteria for AUD based strictly on HD
considerations, apply them to major epidemiological data sets,
and evaluate the outcome in a systematic way. The evaluation
offers the first three-way validator analysis comparing the validity
of the approaches of traditional DSMs, the new DSM-5, and the
HD analysis to defining AUD, using standard validators such as
duration, service use, and comorbidity.
The results suggest that, in terms of the validators we were
able to deploy from the NCS data set, the DSM-5 criteria gener-
ally yielded non-significant trends toward elevated validator levels
relative to the NCS’s DSM-III-R criteria while modestly reduc-
ing prevalence. Thus, the DSM-5 changes seem not to represent
any great progress in terms of validity. In contrast, the HD analy-
sis significantly and substantially increased validator rates over
both DSM-III-R and DSM-5 while also significantly and substan-
tially lowering prevalence rates relative to DSM-III-R and DSM-5
as well as yielding convergent rates across studies. The results
suggest that continued exploration of a somewhat revised out-of-
control model of addictive pathology is warranted. Substantively,
the results indicate that a stricter approach to AUD diagnosis could
yield a lifetime prevalence more in the 6% range than the 30%
range.
This paper also presents the first attempt subsequent to Regier
et al.’s (2) and Narrow et al.’s (3) classic papers to resolve the
two-decade-old puzzle of divergent ECA and NCS prevalence
rates. According to our findings, there is an underlying conver-
gence once a more valid and narrower HD-derived definition of
AUD is applied to the data. This finding of convergent prevalence
rates across studies emerged despite somewhat divergent criteria,
as we had hypothesized. These findings implicitly address broader
doubts about the viability of community studies of psychiatric dis-
order. Of course, convergence can have many other explanations,
and further research will be necessary to confirm that increased
validity is responsible for the present convergence. However, the
validator results reported here tend to support this explanation.
This is also the first successful attempt we know of to formu-
late and test an explanation of the much-discussed puzzle of high
transient adolescent rates of AUD. The high rates of apparently
spontaneously remitting adolescent AUD have been prominently
featured in recent arguments that AUD is not really a disorder at all
but a matter of normal-range choice (4, 5). Our analysis indicates
that the vast majority of these cases do not satisfy HD require-
ments for disorder. This suggests that it might be misguided to
rely on these cases to argue that there is no true AUD, because in
fact the identification of these cases as AUDs in epidemiological
surveys is likely due to invalid definitions of AUD yielding large
numbers of false-positive cases during adolescence.
Hasin’s (77) statement that “we still lack the ability to differ-
entiate between young individuals in the general population who
evidence the criteria and remit and those who go on to develop
chronic, debilitating alcohol or other drug disorders” (p. 703) is no
longer entirely true in light of the present results. Of those young
individuals who satisfied NCS AUD criteria but remitted within
5 years and did not have a current disorder at the time of the NCS
interview, 90% of them were eliminated from the disorder category
by applying the HD analysis criteria, higher than the overall 72%
reduction of prevalence. In contrast, of those young people who
had at least a 10-year duration and had current 1-year disorder
at the time of the NCS interview, only 42% were eliminated as
non-disordered. Thus, HD criteria do offer some predictive power
when it comes to likely transience of adolescent-onset cases.
This paper’s calculations of unmet need for treatment offer an
estimate that, while still challengingly high at about 4.5 million
U.S. adults with unmet need for AUD treatment per year, greatly
diverges from standard unmet need rates of about 17 million indi-
viduals per year. Further research is needed to address whether
these revised estimates represent an improved differentiation of
those with unmet need for treatment of harmful compulsive use
from those experiencing other alcohol-related issues, which they
might or might not want treated. In evaluating these unmet need
results, one must consider the remarkable statistics on unmet ver-
sus felt need from the 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and
Health: “Among the 16.8 million persons aged 12 or older who
needed but did not receive specialty treatment for an alcohol use
problem in 2012, 665,000 persons (4.0%) felt they needed treat-
ment for their alcohol use problem. . .. Of the 665,000, . . ., 490,000
did not make an effort to get treatment, and 174,000 made an
effort but were unable to get treatment” (78). Thus, of those quali-
fying for AUD status under current criteria but who did not receive
treatment, about 1% actually felt they needed treatment and made
some effort to seek treatment but were unsuccessful. While there
are many psychological, social, and institutional obstacles to seek-
ing treatment for AUD, there is a prima facie implausibility to
these extraordinary rates of unfelt need among those purportedly
needing treatment for compulsive alcohol use. Our analysis sug-
gests a possible resolution to this puzzle; a very large number of
these individuals do not have a true AUD with deliberational or
motivational dysfunction and the resulting harm, and they judge,
perhaps correctly, that treatment for AUD is unwarranted.
A surprising finding of this study was that all of the major con-
clusions about validity arrived at from the above comparisons of
HD disorder to combined dependence/abuse held just as strongly
when the HD analysis was compared to DSM dependence. The
present analyses suggest that DSM dependence may not be as
conceptually valid as has sometimes been claimed.
LIMITATIONS
This study had all the limitations of the original cross-sectional
ECA and NCS analyses, such as respondents’ faulty memories and
limitations of lay interviewers. Longitudinal analysis would no
doubt increase HD estimates. We analyzed only psychiatric dis-
orders of deliberative control over alcohol drinking, but there are
many other medical conditions related to alcohol use warranting
treatment so AUD “should therefore not monopolize medical and
social concern” [(37), p. 1060]. Secondary analysis was limited by
the need to use questions as originally worded, rather than word-
ing that would be optimal for the HD approach (e.g., with more
contextual exclusions to eliminate false-positives).
A conceptual limitation is that the HD analysis’s concepts of
“dysfunction” and “harm” that we used to conceptualize AUD,
like other concepts currently used to conceptualize AUDs such as
“compulsive,”“dependent,” or“out-of-control,”are fuzzy concepts.
They thus required difficult judgments to operationalize, which
we reached by discussion and consensus. So, there remains room
www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 10 | 13
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wakefield and Schmitz Alcohol use disorders as harmful dysfunctions
for dispute about HD criteria. However, our judgments resonated
with concerns about validity of diagnostic criteria expressed by
others (72, 74, 79–83). In aiming for plausible prevalence esti-
mates, clearly one can decide within the range of one’s guiding
concepts to err on the side of avoiding false negatives and estab-
lishing relatively high AUD prevalence versus erring on the side
of avoiding false-positives and establishing relatively low preva-
lence of alcoholism. However, validity considerations place limits
on such flexibility if one is attempting to validly identify men-
tal disorder. Future studies should explore alternative choices of
HD-inspired criteria that can be justified theoretically.
Our translation of DSM-5 criteria into NCS questions also
involved subjective judgment. Alternative translations with corre-
spondingly altered results are possible. However, post hoc shadow
analyses suggested that such alternative translations would not
alter the primary findings of the analysis with regard to DSM-5
validators or comparisons of DSM-5 to other approaches.
We restricted our analysis to the ECA and NCS, the two data
sets that were the target of Regier et al.’s (2) and Narrow et al.’s (3)
early reanalyses. This provided a useful comparison point because
they tried a variety of other strategies to increase validity and
cross-study comparability, all of which failed to achieve the desired
result. There are two other major epidemiological data sets avail-
able for public use, the National Comorbidity Survey Replication
(NCS-R) (84) and the NESARC, and it might be asked why these
were not included as well. The NCS-R reported substantially lower
rates of dependence-only prevalence (5.4%) than other studies.
However, it has emerged that the NCS-R used flawed methodology
that generated artificially low dependence prevalence rates. Specif-
ically, respondents were not asked dependence symptom questions
unless they first responded positively to an abuse question, yet the
abuse and dependence questions (taken from DSM-IV) do not
overlap, so this procedure eliminated many dependence cases (9,
85–87). Kessler, the lead NCS-R researcher, admitted that this was
an error and changed the procedure in later studies (88). These
flaws render the NCS-R inappropriate for AUD prevalence stud-
ies, and its low reported dependence rate is meaningless. Regarding
the NESARC, we report the NESARC’s AUD prevalences for com-
parison purposes but we did not reanalyze the NESARC in detail
for this report. This is because that survey provides a very different
array of validators and analysis opportunities that are not available
in the NCS and ECA. A detailed NESARC HD analysis that extends
the present framework is a priority that requires a separate report
and is currently underway.
A further limitation is that our lowered prevalence estimates
are limited to AUD and ignore other alcohol-related pathologies
and problems. Thus, for example, although the HD approach low-
ers AUD prevalence, the prevalence of other psychiatric disorders
induced by heavy use of alcohol (89) and the possible coexistence
of multiple substance abuse in alcoholics (90) remain unaccounted
for in our prevalence rates.
Finally, it should be emphasized that diagnosis is not the same
as treatment need (91), and it is not the same as risk of disorder
despite often being confused with risk (92, 93). Some disorders
are mild and need not be aggressively treated, whereas many
alcohol-related problems, even if not AUDs, create risk or actual
harm that demands intervention.
IMPLICATIONS REGARDING DSM-5
One of the primary findings of our analysis is that DSM-5’s single
AUD category is not much of a change from DSM-IV’s dependence
and abuse combined when it comes to prevalence and validator
results. The prevalence result was expected because DSM-5 AUD
criteria were designed to preserve overall DSM-IV dependence
plus abuse prevalence. However, the lack of validator improve-
ment is more concerning and may reflect an underlying validity
problem. Based on “the lack of data to support an intermedi-
ate state between drug use and drug dependence” [(94), p. 867],
and despite acknowledgment that “the dependence process and
its consequences do seem conceptually distinct” [(77), p. 703], the
DSM-5 criteria make no provision to differentiate AUD from prob-
lem drinking, and the dependence dimension essentially swallows
up symptomatic problem drinking. In giving up the distinction
between disorder and problem drinking and giving up the search
for valid differentiating criteria, DSM-5 likely violates DSM-5’s
definition of mental disorder by classifying some alcohol prob-
lems as disorders even when there is no evidence of underlying
dysfunction (e.g., when there are two abuse symptoms). The
provisional positive evaluation of the HD analysis in this study sug-
gests that the DSM-5 changes may have been premature and may
obscure a potential alternative approach that has many advantages.
It thus appears that the HD approach is worth further empiri-
cal exploration in seeking improved validity of AUD diagnostic
criteria.
CONCLUSION
It remains an open question whether the loss-of-control model is
a satisfactory model of a genuine AUD dysfunction. However, the
results of this study suggest that a problem in testing the loss-of-
control model has been its questionable translation into diagnostic
criteria. Conceptually driven revisions to diagnostic criteria that
particularly attend to dysfunction indicators could lead to cleaner
tests of the model’s validity. This paper’s results argue for a renewed
effort to construct such diagnostic criteria sets that more effectively
distinguish AUDs from other alcohol-related problems and thus
might reduce false-positive AUD diagnoses that lead to confusion
in the scientific and clinical literature.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | DSM-III diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorders and their translation using epidemiologic catchment area study (ECA) questions.
DSM-III diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorders Corresponding ECA questions used for the given DSM-III criteria
DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR ALCOHOL ABUSE (A, B, AND C)
A. Pattern of pathological alcohol use: (any one of) need for
daily use of alcohol for adequate functioning; inability to cut
down or stop drinking; repeated efforts to control or reduce
excess drinking by “going on the wagon“ (periods of
temporary abstinence) or restricting drinking to certain
times of the day; binges (remaining intoxicated throughout
the day for at least 2 days); occasional consumption of a fifth
of spirits (or its equivalent in wine or beer); amnesic periods
for events occurring while intoxicated (blackouts);
continuation of drinking despite a serious physical disorder
that the individual knows is exacerbated by alcohol use;
drinking of non-beverage alcohol
Answer “yes” to any one or more of the following
Have you ever wanted to stop drinking but couldn’t?
Some people promise themselves not to drink before 5 o’clock or never to drink
alone, in order to control their drinking. Have you ever done anything like that?
Have you ever drunk as much as a fifth of liquor in 1 day, that would be about 20
drinks, or three bottles of wine or as much as three six-packs of beer in 1 day?
Have you ever had blackouts while drinking, that is, where you drank enough so that
you couldn’t remember the next day what you had said or done?
Have you ever continued to drink when you knew you had a serious physical illness
that might be made worse by drinking?
Has there ever been a period in your life when you could not do your ordinary daily
work well unless you had had something to drink?
How many times have you gone on benders that lasted at least a couple of days?
(two or more counted as symptom)
B. Impairment in social or occupational functioning due to
alcohol use: e.g., (any one of) violence while intoxicated,
absence from work, loss of job, legal difficulties (e.g., arrest
for intoxicated behavior, traffic accidents while intoxicated),
arguments, or difficulties with family or friends because of
excessive alcohol use
Answer “yes” to any one or more of the following
Has your family ever objected because you were drinking too much?
Have friends, your doctor, your clergyman, or any other professional ever said you
were drinking too much for your own good?
Have you ever had job (or school) troubles because of drinking – like missing too
much work or drinking on the job (or at school)?
Did you ever lose a job (or get kicked out of school) on account of drinking?
Have you ever gotten into trouble driving because of drinking – like having an
accident or being arrested for drunk driving?
Have you ever been arrested or held at the police station because of drinking or for
disturbing the peace while drinking?
Have you ever gotten into physical fights while drinking?
C. Duration of disturbance of at least 1 month (Not measured)
DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE (A AND B)
A. Either a pattern of pathological alcohol use or impairment
in social or occupational functioning due to alcohol use (i.e.,
any one symptom of either pathological use or impairment;
see above Alcohol Abuse criteria for pathological use and for
impairment in social or occupational functioning)
Answer “yes” to any one or more of the questions above for either pathological use
or impairment in social or occupational functioning (see ECA questions used for
alcohol abuse)
B. Either tolerance or withdrawal Answer “yes” to any one or more of the following
Tolerance: need for markedly increased amounts of alcohol
to achieve the desired effect, or markedly diminished effect
with regular use of the same amount
Has there ever been a period of 2 weeks when every day you were drinking seven or
more beers, seven or more drinks, or seven or more glasses of wine?
Withdrawal: development of alcohol withdrawal (e.g.,
morning “shakes” and malaise relieved by drinking) after
cessation of or reduction in drinking
Did you ever need a drink just after you had gotten up (that is, before breakfast)?
Have you ever had “the shakes” after stopping or cutting down on drinking (for
example, your hands shake so that your coffee cup rattles in the saucer or you have
trouble lighting a cigarette)?
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Table A2 | DSM-III-R diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorders and their translation using National Comorbidity Survey (NCS) questions.
DSM-III-R diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorders Corresponding NCS questions used for the given DSM-III-R criteria
DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOACTIVE ALCOHOL ABUSE (A, B, AND C)
A. A maladaptive pattern of psychoactive substance use
indicated by at least one of the following
Answer “yes” to any one or more of the following
Did alcohol ever cause you problems with your family, friends, at work, at school or
with the police?
Did your use of alcohol ever cause you to be expelled from school, or to be demoted
or fired from work?
(1) Continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent
or recurrent social, occupational, psychological, or physical
problem that is caused or exacerbated by use of the
psychoactive substance
(2) Recurrent use in situations in which use is physically
hazardous (e.g., driving while intoxicated)
Have you often been under the effects of alcohol or feeling its after-effects in a
situation which increased your chances of getting hurt – like when driving a car or
boat, using knives or guns or machinery, crossing against traffic, climbing or
swimming?
Did you continue to use alcohol after it caused an accident (when you injured
yourself while under the influence of alcohol – like had a bad fall or cut yourself
badly, been hurt in a traffic accident, or anything like that)?
Have you ever had any health problems as a result of using alcohol – such as liver
disease, stomach disease, pancreatitis, feet tingling, numbness, memory problems,
an accidental overdose, a persistent cough, a seizure of fit, hepatitis, or abscesses?
Have you ever had any emotional or psychological problems from using
alcohol – such as feeling uninterested in things, feeling depressed, suspicious of
people, paranoid, or having strange ideas?
B. Some symptoms of the disturbance have persisted for at
least 1 month, or have occurred repeatedly over a longer
period of time
Built into the question responses in the NCS, emphasizing the word “often” in the
symptom question, or coding symptom duration lasting at least 1-year within the
diagnostic algorithm.
C. Never met the criteria for psychoactive substance
dependence for this substance
Built into the hierarchy for NCS diagnosis; abuse can be diagnosed only if
dependence is not diagnosed
DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOACTIVE ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE (A AND B)
A. At least three of the following At least three of the following (to satisfy a given DSM-III-R numbered criterion,
answer “yes” to any one or more of the corresponding NCS questions)
(1) Substance often taken in larger amounts or over a longer
period than the person intended
Did you often use larger amounts of alcohol than you intended to when you began,
or did you use it for a longer period of time than you intended to?
Did you often start using alcohol and find it difficult to stop before you became
completely intoxicated or high?
(2) Persistent desire or one or more unsuccessful efforts to
cut down or control substance use
Have you ever felt such a strong desire or urge to use alcohol that you could not
resist it or could not think of anything else?
Did your use of alcohol ever become so regular that you would not change when, or
how much you took it, no matter what you were doing or where you were?
Have you ever wanted or tried to stop or cut down on alcohol but found you could
not?
(3) A great deal of time spent in activities necessary to get
the substance (e.g., theft), taking the substance (e.g., chain
smoking), or recovering from its effects
Did you ever have a period of a month or more when you spent a great deal of time
using alcohol, getting it, or getting over its effects?
(4) Frequent intoxication or withdrawal symptoms when
expected to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or
home (e.g., does not go to work because hung over, goes to
school or work “high,” intoxicated while taking care of his or
her children), or when substance use is physically hazardous
(e.g., drives while intoxicated)
Have you often been under the effects of alcohol or suffering its after-effects while at
work or school or taking care of children?
Has your use of alcohol often kept you from working, going to school, or taking care
of children?
Have you often been under the effects of alcohol or feeling its after-effects in a
situation which increased your chances of getting hurt – like when driving a car or
boat, using knives or guns or machinery, crossing against traffic, climbing or
swimming?
(Continued)
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Table A2 | Continued
DSM-III-R diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorders Corresponding NCS questions used for the given DSM-III-R criteria
(5) Important social, occupational, or recreational activities
given up or reduced because of substance use
Have you ever given up or greatly reduced important activities in order to get, or to
use alcohol – activities like sports, work, or seeing family and friends?
(6) Continued substance use despite knowledge of having a
persistent or recurrent social, psychological, or physical
problem that is caused or exacerbated by the use of the
substance (e.g., keeps using heroin despite family
arguments about it, cocaine-induced depression, or having
an ulcer made worse by drinking)
Did alcohol ever cause you problems with your family, friends, at work, at school, or
with the police?
Did your use of alcohol ever cause you to be expelled from school, or to be demoted
or fired from work?
Did you continue to use alcohol after it caused an accident (when you injured
yourself while under the influence of alcohol – like had a bad fall or cut yourself
badly, been hurt in a traffic accident, or anything like that)?
Have you ever had any health problems as a result of using alcohol – such as liver
disease, stomach disease, pancreatitis, feet tingling, numbness, memory problems,
an accidental overdose, a persistent cough, a seizure of fit, hepatitis, or abscesses?
Have you ever had any emotional or psychological problems from using
alcohol – such as feeling uninterested in things, feeling depressed, suspicious of
people, paranoid, or having strange ideas?
(7) Marked tolerance: need for markedly increased amounts
of the substance (i.e., at least a 50% increase) in order to
achieve intoxication or desired effect, or markedly
diminished effect with continued use of the same amount
Did you ever find that you had to use more alcohol than usual to get the same effect
or that the same amount had less effect on you than before?
(8) Characteristic symptoms of withdrawal Did stopping or cutting down on alcohol ever make you sick or cause you problems
like those listed on page 17?
(9) Substance often taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal
symptoms
Did you ever use alcohol to make these withdrawal symptoms go away or to keep
from having them?
B. Some symptoms of the disturbance have persisted for at
least 1 month, or have occurred repeatedly over a longer
period of time
In the NCS at least two of the above nine symptoms had to occur often or persist for
at least 1-year
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Table A3 | Harmful dysfunction (HD) diagnostic categories of harm and dysfunction and how they were translated using epidemiologic
catchment area study (ECA) questions.
HD/ECA ECA alcohol question
Harm Has your family ever objected because you were drinking too much?
Harm Have friends, your doctor, your clergyman, or any other professional ever said you were drinking too much for your own good?
Harm Have you ever had job (or school) troubles because of drinking – like missing too much work or drinking on the job (or at school)?
Harm Did you ever lose a job (or get kicked out of school) on account of drinking?
Harm Have you ever gotten into trouble driving because of drinking – like having an accident or being arrested for drunk driving?
Harm Have you ever been arrested or held at the police station because of drinking or for disturbing the peace while driving?
Harm Have you ever gotten into physical fights while drinking?
Harm Have you ever had blackouts while driving, that is, where you drank enough so that you could not remember the next day what you had
said or done?
Harm Did drinking ever cause you to have liver disease or yellow jaundice?
Harm Did drinking ever cause you to have vomiting blood or other stomach troubles?
Harm Did drinking ever cause you to have trouble with tingling or numbness in your feet?
Harm Did drinking ever cause you to have memory trouble when you haven’t been drinking (not blackouts)
Harm Did drinking ever cause you to have inflammation of your pancreas, or pancreatitis?
Harm Have you ever continued to drink when you knew you had a serious physical illness that might be made worse by drinking?
Dysfunction Have you ever had “the shakes” after stopping or cutting down on drinking (for example, your hands shake so that your coffee cup
rattles in the saucer or you have trouble lighting a cigarette)?
Dysfunction Have you ever had fits or seizures after stopping or cutting down on drinking?
Dysfunction Have you ever had the DT’s (Hallucinations and fever) when you quit drinking?
Dysfunction Have you ever seen or heard things that weren’t really there after cutting down on drinking?
Dysfunction Did you ever need a drink just after you had gotten up (that is, before breakfast)?
Dysfunction Has there ever been a period in your life when you could not do your ordinary daily work well unless you had had something to drink?
Dysfunction Have you ever wanted to stop drinking but couldn’t?
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Table A4 | Harmful dysfunction (HD) diagnostic categories of harm and dysfunction and how they were translated using National Comorbidity
Survey (NCS) questions.
HD/NCS HD/NCS
(ECA comparable)
NCS alcohol question
Harm Not used Has your use of alcohol often kept you from working, going to school, or taking care of children?
Harm Harm Did alcohol ever cause you problems with your family, friends, at work, at school, or with the police?
Harm Harm Did your use of alcohol ever cause you to be expelled from school, or to be demoted or fired from work?
Harm Harm Have you often been under the effects of alcohol or feeling its after-effects in a situation which increased your
chances of getting hurt – like when driving a car or boat, using knives or guns or machinery, crossing against
traffic, climbing or swimming?
Harm Harm Did you continue to use alcohol after it caused an accident (when you injured yourself while under the influence
of alcohol – like had a bad fall or cut yourself badly, been hurt in a traffic accident, or anything like that)?
Harm Harm Have you ever had any health problems as a result of using alcohol – such as liver disease, stomach disease,
pancreatitis, feet tingling, numbness, memory problems, an accidental overdose, a persistent cough, a seizure
of fit, hepatitis, or abscesses?
Harm Harm Have you ever had any emotional or psychological problems from using alcohol – such as feeling uninterested in
things, feeling depressed, suspicious of people, paranoid, or having strange ideas?
Harm Harm Did you ever continue to use alcohol while taking medication you knew was dangerous to mix with alcohol or
drugs, or when you had a serious health problem that could be made worse by alcohol or drugs?
Harm Harm Have you ever given up or greatly reduced important activities in order to get, or to use alcohol – activities like
sports, work, or seeing family and friends?
Dysfunction Dysfunction Did stopping or cutting down on alcohol ever make you sick or cause you problems like those listed on page 17?
Dysfunction Dysfunction Did you ever use alcohol to make these withdrawal symptoms go away or to keep from having them?
Dysfunction Dysfunction Have you ever wanted or tried to stop or cut down on alcohol but found you could not?
Dysfunction Not used Have you ever felt such a strong desire or urge to use alcohol that you could not resist it or could not think of
anything else?
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Table A5 | DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorder and their translation using National Comorbidity Survey (NCS) questions.
DSM-5 Alcohol use disorder criteria NCS questions used for the given criteria
A. A problematic pattern of alcohol use leading to clinically
significant impairment or distress, as manifested by at least two
of the following, occurring within a 12-month period
1. Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period
than was intended
Did you often use larger amounts of alcohol than you intended to when you
began, or did you use it for a longer period of time than you intended to?
2. There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down
or control alcohol use
Have you ever wanted or tried to stop or cut down on alcohol but found you
could not?
3. A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain
alcohol, use alcohol, or recover from its effects
Did you ever have a period of a month or more when you spent a great deal of
time using alcohol, getting it, or getting over its effects?
4. Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use alcohol Have you ever felt such a strong desire or urge to use alcohol that you could
not resist it or could not think of anything else?
5. Recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role
obligations at work, school, or home
Has your use of alcohol often kept you from working, going to school, or taking
care of children?
Did your use of alcohol ever cause you to be expelled from school, or to be
demoted or fired from work?
6. Continued alcohol use despite having persistent or recurrent
social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the
effects of alcohol
Did alcohol ever cause you problems with your family, friends, at work, at
school or with the police?
Did you continue to use alcohol after it caused an accident (when you injured
yourself while under the influence of alcohol – like had a bad fall or cut yourself
badly, been hurt in a traffic accident, or anything like that)?
7. Important social, occupational, or recreational activities are
given up or reduced because of alcohol use
Have you ever given up or greatly reduced important activities in order to get,
or to use alcohol – activities like sports, work, or seeing family and friends?
8. Recurrent alcohol use in situations in which it is physically
hazardous
Have you often been under the effects of alcohol or feeling its after-effects in a
situation which increased your chances of getting hurt – like when driving a car
or boat, using knives or guns or machinery, crossing against traffic, climbing or
swimming?
9. Alcohol use is continued despite knowledge of having a
persistent or recurrent physical or psychological problem that is
likely to have been caused or exacerbated by alcohol
Did you ever continue to use alcohol while taking medication you knew was
dangerous to mix with alcohol or drugs, or when you had a serious health
problem that could be made worse by alcohol or drugs?
10. Tolerance, as defined by either of the following: Did you ever find that you had to use more alcohol than usual to get the same
effect or that the same amount had less effect on you than before?a. A need for markedly increased amounts of alcohol to achieve
intoxication or desired effect
b. Markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same
amount of alcohol
11. Withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following:
a. The characteristic withdrawal syndrome for alcohol (refer to
Criteria A and B of the criteria set for alcohol withdrawal)
Did stopping or cutting down on alcohol ever make you sick or cause you
problems like those listed on page 17?
Did you ever use alcohol to make these withdrawal symptoms go away or to
keep from having them?b. Alcohol (or a closely related substance, such as a
benzodiazepine) is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms
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